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INTRODUCTION 
Concerns about the impacts of growing global demand for energy were already identified at the time 
of the original Sussex Manifesto (Singer et al 1970), especially regarding the prudent use of finite 
fossil fuel resources. The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al 1972)
 
and other writings around the same 
time (see for example Buckminster-Fuller 1969) pointed with urgency towards the risk of exhausting 
fossil fuel resources.  Whilst many of the predictions of exhaustion within Limits to Growth were 
clearly wrong, concerns about resource scarcity have not gone away. Energy policy debates have 
recently returned to this issue, and increasingly mirror those of the early 1970s. The possibility of an 
impending peak in global oil production is frequently highlighted, though its immediacy and impacts 
remain subject to extensive uncertainty and controversy (e.g. Bentley et al 2007; Watkins 2006)
1
. 
 
Limits to Growth also mentioned the other important global energy policy challenge: climate 
change. Although it highlighted increases in CO2 emissions as a result of human fossil fuel 
combustion, it primarily focused on the potential role of ‘thermal pollution’  (direct heating of the 
atmosphere by fossil fuel combustion) rather than an enhanced albedo effect (Meadows et al 1972: 
72-74).  The SPRU response to Limits to Growth focused on the problem of declining supplies of 
fossil fuels and uranium, and cited work that dismissed thermal pollution and CO2 generation as a 
‘bogey’ that should not distract us from the real problem of resource scarcity (Cole et al 1973: 
90,106). Clearly the science has moved on since then. We now know that anthropogenic emissions 
of CO2 are causing climate change. Furthermore, without radical reductions in emissions the impacts 
on humanity and the earth are likely to be extremely serious (IPCC 2007).  
 
This paper is based on empirical work conducted within the Sussex Energy Group at SPRU in recent 
years on energy, climate change and development. It sets out our views on the role of low carbon 
innovation in future sustainable development pathways for developing countries. 
THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF ENERGY FOR GROWTH 
Despite the wave of scholarship in the late 1960s and early 1970s that broadened the notion of 
‘development’ (see Ely and Bell 2009), the term is still often used as synonymous with ‘economic 
growth’. More often than not, growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) acts as an implicit 
development objective, and despite its weaknesses, GDP per capita remains the primary metric used 
to differentiate between countries’ levels of development. More recently, some metrics have added 
life expectancy and education components to this, for example, in the UNDP Human Development 
Index.   
 
The shortfalls of equating development with economic growth are now beginning to influence more 
mainstream debate (see for example Jackson 2009). For now, however, let us accept that sustained 
economic growth is an imperative for the vast majority of governments across the world, and this 
growth is measured using GDP.   
 
Today, worries about diminishing supplies of fossil fuels, especially illustrated by the ‘peak oil’ debate 
and associated concerns over energy security, are resurfacing. Furthermore, transforming energy 
systems to avoid further anthropogenic climate change is seen as an urgent challenge facing 
mankind (Scrase and MacKerron 2009).  Recent research suggests that the halving of global 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 envisaged by recent G8 Communiqués still have a 12–45% 
                                                          
1
 Through the UK Energy Research Centre, the Sussex Energy Group is currently investigating the proposition 
that global demand for conventional oil will be constrained by resource availability before 2020. 
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probability of exceeding 2 °C, the level widely thought of as leading to ‘dangerous’ climate change 
(Meinshausen et al 2009).  The economist Nicholas Stern argues that in order to limit atmospheric 
carbon dioxide to 500 parts per million ‘we will need a revolution that surpasses the scale and impact 
of previous world-changing technologies such as railways and personal computers’ (Brahic 2009).  
The transition to low-carbon energy systems (that might also achieve radical reductions in energy 
intensity) is perhaps central to the global innovation challenge for the New Manifesto. This transition 
also clearly illustrates the importance not merely of the rate or scale of innovation, but of the 
direction in which innovation (and the systems within which it occurs) must develop. 
 
In comparison to other sectors, energy has been shown to be of fundamental importance to 
economic activity. Increases in GDP have historically been, and seem set to continue to be, coupled 
to corresponding increases in energy use. This is borne out both by empirical evidence and the 
strands of economic theory that account for the laws of thermodynamics, which govern the use of 
energy and its physical by-products (Ockwell 2008). As the use of energy, principally from fossil fuels, 
accounts for over 60% of global greenhouse gas emissions, this implies an urgent imperative to 
decarbonise energy systems. 
 
In addition to this, there may be a need to change the direction and/or composition of economic 
growth. As noted earlier, fundamental questions about the sustainability of conventional economic 
growth are increasingly being raised in mainstream debates. A recent example is a report from the 
Sustainable Development Commission, an official advisory body for the UK government (Jackson 
2009). The Sustainable Development Commission report argues that the stabilisation or reduction of 
the level of economic activity would not necessarily mean a similar curtailing of broader processes of 
development and progress by societies. However, it also acknowledges that redefining notions of 
progress and development so that they are not reliant on conventional economic growth is 
extremely challenging.
2
 
 
Given the practical unlikelihood of any shift away from the political imperative for sustained 
economic growth – at least in the near future – the transition to low carbon societies requires a 
particular emphasis on decarbonising energy supplies (Japan-UK Working Group 2008; G8 2009; 
DECC 2009). This demands the rapid diffusion of low carbon energy technologies – be they energy 
generation, transmission or efficient end use technologies – and thus change at a systemic level. 
Efficient end-use technologies, for example, whilst unlikely to be sufficient on their own to decouple 
growth from energy use, are likely to play an integral role in the transition to low carbon societies.  
 
Making the transition to a low carbon economy requires leadership from, and presents a significant 
challenge to, the developed world, which is currently locked in to high carbon technological, 
economic and social systems (Unruh and Carillo-Hermosilla 2006). But the challenge is not limited to 
the developed world, which will most likely suffer less severe impacts from the climatic changes 
driven by carbon emissions from economic activity. It also implies an urgent need for developing 
countries to follow low carbon growth pathways, which avoid the energy/carbon intensive systems 
configurations that have characterised, and continue to characterise developed nations. This is 
particularly important for the middle income emerging economies: China, India, Brazil, Mexico and 
South Africa which have large current and projected increases in fossil fuel use.  
 
This kind of low carbon global transition by middle income countries could also set a trend for less 
developed nations to follow at later stages of their development.  Rather than following the previous 
trajectories of industrialisation the opportunity exists for the emerging economies to drive new 
innovation trajectories that bypass and avoid lock-in to those regimes and systems most responsible 
for global climate change (Sauter and Watson 2008; Ely and Scoones 2009).  
                                                          
2
 See Stirling, A. (2009) Direction, Distribution, Diversity! Pluralising Progress in Innovation, Sustainability and 
Development, STEPS Working Paper 32, Brighton: STEPS Centre, for further discussion of ‘notions of progress’. 
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INNOVATIVE CAPABILITIES FOR LOW CARBON DEVELOPMENT 
It is often argued that a pre-requisite for low carbon development in emerging/developing 
economies is the transfer of low carbon technologies from where they are predominantly owned in 
the North, to where they can be put to good use in the South to avoid emissions from future 
economic growth. ‘Low carbon technology transfer’ is a phrase that dominates the more 
controversial negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and 
forms one of four central objectives under the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC 2007). In Bali countries 
agreed to support actions aimed at increasing the transfer and diffusion of affordable low carbon 
energy technologies, increasing research and development (R&D) cooperation, promoting financial 
mechanisms to support this work, and assessing the effectiveness of mechanisms and tools for 
technology cooperation in certain sectors.  
 
What the political discourse generally fails to account for, however, is the fact that in order for a 
process of technology transfer to underpin long term, low carbon economic growth, it is not 
sufficient to merely sell/give a country, firm or organization pieces of ‘hardware’, or physical, tangible 
objects. It is also imperative that the technological know-how that underpins the processes of 
innovation in low carbon technologies, sometimes referred to as ‘software’ (e.g. knowledge, 
processes), is also developed within – or transferred to – developing countries. In this way developing 
nations can build the expertise necessary to become low carbon producers and innovators in their 
own right, as opposed to just being consumers of new technology, in many ways dependent on 
continued imports. Furthermore, technology transfer is not just a process that can be carried out 
between developed and developing country governments. Firms and other actors such as research 
institutes – many of them privately owned – are key to this process since it is they (not governments) 
who develop low carbon technologies, and buy and sell them in markets. 
 
The process of acquiring new innovative capabilities within firms and other organisations in 
developing countries, elsewhere referred to as technological learning or developing new 
‘technological capacity’ (Ockwell et al 2008; Bell 2009), has been studied for more than two decades 
by scholars in Latin America (e.g. Katz 1987), India (e.g. Lall 1987), South Korea (e.g. Kim 1987) and 
elsewhere. It is further analysed with respect to directions of development within other papers in this 
series. In one of these papers (Bell 2009), Martin Bell makes the important point that technology 
imports into developing countries and localised innovation within those countries are not 
alternatives – but are complementary processes that are often both necessary to develop innovative 
capabilities. For example, South Korea’s automotive manufacturers were able to catch up with 
international market leaders through a combination of indigenous technology development and 
international technology acquisition (Sauter and Watson 2008). Therefore, the potential for realising 
sustained low carbon growth trajectories in emerging economies rests on the development of these 
new low carbon innovation capabilities – and a careful balance between international and domestic 
sources of these capabilities.  
 
Recent research by the Sussex Energy Group and the Tyndall Centre has explored four possible low 
carbon development pathways for China (Wang and Watson 2008). These pathways combine 
continued economic development with limits on cumulative carbon emissions over the period to 
2050. Within each pathway, the role of low carbon innovation is explicitly analysed. A key issue is the 
relationship between this innovation and the speed at which Chinese carbon emissions growth could 
slow down – and eventually be reversed. Within some of the scenarios analysed, China’s emissions 
could peak as early as 2020 as a result of rapid changes in industrial structure (e.g. in favour of high 
value added industries and services) and quick progress with the development and deployment of 
low carbon technologies. International technology transfer would play a key role in this technological 
development process since the gap between the capabilities of Chinese firms and those of 
internationally leading firms remains large in many sectors. 
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International technology transfer arrangements and the policy incentives put in place to encourage 
technology transfer therefore need to focus on how they can contribute constructively to this 
process of innovation capability-building over time. Our research with colleagues in India on barriers 
to the transfer of low carbon energy technologies has flagged up several key considerations for 
guiding policy geared towards developing new innovation capabilities (Ockwell et al 2008; Ockwell et 
al forthcoming). These include:  
 
Low carbon technologies are at different stages of development. This means that low carbon 
technology transfer involves both vertical transfer (the transfer of technologies from the R&D stage 
through to commercialisation) and horizontal transfer (the transfer from one geographical location 
to another) transfer. Barriers to transfer and appropriate policy responses often vary according to the 
stage of technology development as well as the specific source and recipient country contexts. This 
issue of context specificity is addressed further below. 
 
Less integrated technology transfer arrangements involving, for example, acquisition of different 
components of an energy technology from a range of host country equipment manufacturers, are 
more likely to involve knowledge exchange and diffusion through recipient country economies than 
more integrated arrangements, such as turnkey plants or projects, i.e. those which are ready (at the 
turn of a key) for the ‘customer’ to use or operate. 
 
Recipient firms that strategically aim to obtain technological know-how and knowledge necessary 
for innovation as part of the transfer process (building absorptive capacity) are more likely to be able 
to develop their capabilities as a result. For example, Kim (1998) demonstrates how managers within 
Hyundai took a strategic approach to acquiring migratory knowledge (knowledge that can be 
accessed relatively easily) during the acquisition of foreign technology in order to expand the firm’s 
existing knowledge base.  This factor is seen as having been instrumental in intensifying Hyundai’s 
organisational learning and shifting the company’s learning orientation from imitation to innovation. 
 
Other considerations include the role of Intellectual Property (IP), domestic policy drivers and 
collaborative research, development, demonstration and deployment arrangements. These issues 
are dealt with in more detail below. 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Much debate has tended to focus on the role that IP (by which most commentators in the low carbon 
energy context tend to mean patents) might play in facilitating technology transfer. The G77/China 
under the UNFCCC negotiations, for example, have proposed the creation of a multilateral fund to 
buy up IP in relation to low carbon technologies, somewhat akin to the ‘technology transfer bank’ 
proposed in the original Sussex Manifesto
3
. Annex I nations tend to be resistant to this proposal, 
arguing that developing countries having access to IP will not necessarily equate with technology 
development (See for example DECC 2009; UNCTAD-ICTSD 2003) as discussed further below. 
Empirical evidence to date on the role of IP is mixed. Various studies (Barton 2007; Lewis 2007), 
including our own as yet unpublished work in India
4
, have shown that the picture is more 
complicated than the political debate implies (for a detailed discussion see Ockwell et al 
forthcoming). Whilst with all the technologies studied, firms in emerging economies (India and China 
being the two countries most studied) are active at some point along the research, development, 
demonstration and deployment (RDD&D) spectrum, at the time of study none were producing at the 
cutting edge. We have found in our research that lack of access to IP did seem to have the potential 
                                                          
3
 This was proposed as ‘a valuable if partial solution’ to ‘the problem of access to technology’ (see Singer et al 
1970: paragraph 8). 
4
 Phase II of the UK-India collaborative study on low carbon technology transfer is awaiting release pending 
Government of India sign off – see http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sussexenergygroup/1-2-9.html for updates. 
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to slow the rate at which firms in developing economies could begin to reach the cutting edge. For 
example, successful Indian photovoltaic technology firms predicted difficulties in moving to produce 
thin film grade silicon, and Indian automotive firms and related public sector organisations were, 
despite a successful public-private Indian collaborative partnership, taking time to negotiate the IP 
that exists in relation to hybrid vehicles. This suggests that in some instances access to IP might 
indeed need to be facilitated via international policy mechanisms.   
 
But simple access to IP is only part of the picture. Many low carbon technologies have a vast array of 
associated patents. Even in cases where access to these patents is possible, this is often not enough 
for firms to begin producing these technologies. A huge amount of knowledge is often protected by 
companies in the form of trade secrets and tacit knowledge relating to, for example, the 
management and manufacturing systems that underpin the ability to apply these patents within the 
production process. For example, in 2006 when we spoke to Indian Light Emitting Diode (LED) 
manufacturers they emphasised that access to IP relating to white LEDs would not enable them to 
start manufacturing this technology.  Instead, what they wanted most was access to existing 
manufacturers’ knowledge about the manufacturing processes involved. Moreover, IP does not 
necessarily provide knowledge of the processes of innovation that lay behind the development of 
new low carbon technologies to which the IP relates.  It is access to this ‘know-why’ knowledge 
(knowledge of the processes that lead to new innovations and why they work), and hence not IP in 
isolation, that underpins the development of new low carbon innovative capabilities.  
 
It is also not clear how much a fund that bought up IP would address the problem of additional costs 
associated with low carbon technologies. A key reason why conventional, high carbon technologies 
are often more attractive than advanced, low carbon technologies is that conventional technologies 
tend to be cheaper. It is unclear how much of the additional cost of low carbon technologies is 
related to IP, but in many instances this cost is unlikely to be significant enough to make low carbon 
technologies financially competitive if met by an international IP fund. An IGCC plant, for example, 
might be 25-30% more expensive than a supercritical conventional coal fired power plant, but only a 
small proportion of that additional cost is likely to be associated with IP.  In addition to licensing fees, 
these higher costs relate to the capital intensity and complexity of IGCC technology. It is not yet a 
fully commercial technology (at least in coal fired applications). Therefore its costs include many ‘first 
of a kind’ elements generally associated with newer technologies. Our research in India suggests that 
a far more important barrier than IP for Indian companies wishing to work with IGCC has been 
difficulties related to accessing knowledge on the practical experiences of global leaders in this 
technology, compounded by the fact that there are few suppliers and only semi-commercial plants 
in operation worldwide – thus again emphasising the importance of tacit knowledge.  
 
The higher costs of many low carbon technologies suggest that substantial international funding 
needs to be part of the policy tool box available to help develop low carbon innovation capabilities in 
developing countries. But domestic policy will also play an essential role, just as it will in developed 
countries. Without regulations to limit or price carbon emissions in key economic sectors (e.g. 
transport or power generation), there will be a lack of demand for more expensive low carbon 
technologies. Increased demand is essential for driving economies of scale and reducing production 
costs, thus driving down prices and further stimulating demand. The high cost of batteries for hybrid 
vehicles, for example, is unlikely to decrease without more large scale production, which needs to be 
driven by increases in demand for hybrid and/or electric vehicles. 
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INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIVE RDD&D  
But how, in practice, can the development of new, low carbon innovation capabilities be facilitated? 
Certainly the production of ‘Technology Needs Assessments’ (TNAs) under the UNFCCC,
5
 which read 
more like technology wish lists than detailed assessments of technological needs and existing 
capabilities, is unlikely to achieve this. This has led to a number of proposals for institutional and 
policy innovations designed to develop these capabilities. For example, think tanks E3G and Chatham 
House have advocated the establishment of low carbon zones in China (Findlay and Preston 2008). 
These mirror the Special Economic Zones that were at the forefront of China’s opening up policies of 
the 1980s. They are conceived as specific geographical areas in which institutions and incentives are 
designed to foster and accelerate low carbon innovation and development. International assistance 
in the form of financial and other support is envisaged to help establish these zones. Similarly, the 
UK’s Carbon Trust has developed a concept for a network of low carbon innovation centres in 
developing countries (Carbon Trust 2008). This concept is now being taken forward as a pilot project 
by DFID and the World Bank (see below). 
 
Our own research has focused on the possible role of collaborations between international 
technology leaders and firms and/or organizations in developing countries. These could focus at any 
point along the RDD&D spectrum, depending on where developing country firms’ existing 
capabilities imply they might benefit most. For example, Indian companies working to develop hybrid 
vehicles are making inroads into demonstration initiatives, and thus might benefit most from 
engagement with technology leaders at this level, or in learning from others’ experiences of how to 
move from demonstration to commercial deployment. Indian wind companies looking to develop 
cutting edge wind turbine blades that achieve high efficiencies at lower wind speeds might benefit 
most from collaborations at earlier research and development stages. In general, firms in developing 
nations would benefit from more direct access to the tacit knowledge and experience of leading 
firms. This is the rationale behind the Carbon Trust’s proposal for low carbon innovation centres, and 
has now led to a joint initiative between infoDev, which is a global financing programme among 
development agencies, administered by a Secretariat at the World Bank, and the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID). Launched in London in July 2009, the project aims to examine 
opportunities and barriers to low carbon innovation in selected pilot countries (Phase I).  A potential 
Phase II would provide seed money from the World Bank to follow on the results of the initial 
findings, possibly leading to the creation of low carbon innovation centres in these countries, in 
partnership with local private and public partners.
6
  
 
International collaborations at earlier stages of technology development also have the potential to 
overcome IP issues if resulting IP were jointly owned by the collaborating entities, although this 
would require careful negotiation at the outset. Consideration might also need to be given as to 
whether it was desirable for collaborations that benefit from public funding to make resulting IP 
publicly available after a given time period.  For instance, our recent research has focused on the 
hybrid vehicles in India. The Indian government has provided 70% of the US$140 million required to 
kick-start the National Hybrid Propulsion Program (NHPP), which encourages indigenous innovation 
in the area of hybrid vehicles.  Here, companies and organizations involved in the initiative have 
agreed to keep the IP on technologies they have developed individually, but to share the IP on any 
new advances established jointly. There is also an understanding that the jointly developed IP will be 
publicly released several years after development.  
 
But any policy aiming to achieve international collaborative RDD&D will have to overcome a difficult 
problem, namely the concern of private firms and national governments with sustaining any 
technological advantage they may have. Careful thought therefore needs to be given to how 
                                                          
5
 See http://unfccc.int/ttclear/jsp/CountryReports.jsp (accessed 16th August 2009) for further information. 
6
 See http://www.infodev.org/en/Article.392.html (accessed 16th August 2009) for further information. 
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international collaborations might be facilitated in such a way as to provide sufficient incentives to 
engage international technology leaders, or even second tier companies. This might be achieved by 
highlighting new market opportunities that might exist in developing nations, particularly if this were 
underpinned by policy commitments at a domestic level that favoured low carbon technologies. 
Another incentive that might be better researched and communicated to international firms is the 
extent to which adapting technologies to local contexts in developing countries can open up new 
markets – an insight observed by The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI)’s work on energy 
efficiency improvements amongst Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) in the glass and 
foundry sectors in India (see Pal 2006, for example). 
WHERE DOES POVERTY COME INTO ALL OF THIS? 
Readers will have noted the emphasis thus far on emerging economies – in particular India and 
China. From a climate change mitigation perspective, this emphasis is understandable. Rapidly 
developing middle income countries already contribute significantly to global emissions (though 
their per capita emissions remain well below those of OECD countries). It is also important to 
remember that such middle income countries continue to face the challenge of lifting large 
numbers of their citizens out of poverty. However, any successful policy response needs to be 
context specific – and to take into account other, less developed countries as well. Many less 
developed countries are on the front line of climate change and are already starting to experience its 
effects. Their capacity to adapt to climate change is often comparatively weak. Furthermore, many of 
their citizens lack access to modern energy systems and the services these offer.  
 
The appropriateness of different policy responses relies on a range of context-sensitive factors, such 
as: the nature of different technologies; their appropriateness within different country contexts; the 
institutional architecture and related barriers and incentives that exist within different countries and 
in different regions within those countries; and the different needs of different parts of society within 
and across countries. For example, what is appropriate for a rapidly emerging economy like China is 
unlikely to be right for many countries in South-East Asia or Sub-Saharan Africa. This might be 
related to existing levels of (economic) development, or it might be due to existing technological or 
institutional characteristics. It could also be influenced by climatic or ecological considerations – the 
appropriateness of wind, solar, hydro or biofuel solutions, for example, is hugely variable across 
different countries. Middle income countries such as China already have significant energy 
infrastructures that require radical change to make them more sustainable as well as further 
development. Low income countries such as Kenya have comparatively weak energy infrastructures 
which contribute little to global problems such as climate change. For the latter group, a key priority 
is to extend these infrastructures – and to do so in a sustainable way. 
 
A point that is also often ignored within the international debate, particularly on technology transfer, 
is the point mentioned above relating to the variation in needs within a country. To what extent, for 
example, is technology transfer likely to meet the needs of the rural poor? Across much of the 
developing world, the majority of people without electricity are living in rural areas (Modi et al 2005: 
116; Vedavilli 2007). Politicians might be attracted to large infrastructure projects in order to secure 
reliable power for key economic centres. But poor people in rural areas might benefit far more 
significantly from simple to operate and repair, distributed energy technologies, such as solar cells 
with LED lighting that could facilitate a shift away from a reliance on kerosene.  Furthermore, such 
distributed solutions could be more cost effective in some circumstances. 
 
Important lessons can be drawn from the attempted implementation of a ‘one-policy-fits-all’ model 
(Xu 2006) of electricity sector reform around the world since the 1990s. Liberalisation and 
privatisation has often been advocated as a way to ensure the necessary investment in energy 
infrastructure. Among other things, this model failed to address the different starting points and 
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institutions existing within different countries (Besant-Jones 2006). Whilst the goal of reform - an 
efficient, sustainable and affordable electricity supply – was undisputed, how to get there was not. 
Adaptability of the model was limited by low indigenous capabilities, dependence on foreign 
consultants and donor conditionality. The resultant lock-in led to significant underinvestment as 
traditional lenders withdrew to make way for private investors who never arrived and in many cases 
culminated in the rejection of reform altogether. What can be seen today is the growth of hybrid 
electricity sector models (Gratwick and Eberhard 2008) based on what is locally appropriate and 
feasible. Applying this lesson to the debate on technology transfer and developing indigenous 
capabilities, it is imperative that local conditions are taken into account and an array of pathways 
kept open.  
 
The development of low-carbon energy systems in low-income countries through technology 
transfer and development of indigenous capabilities is certainly blighted by huge capacity 
constraints.  However, another central challenge when considering the diversity of socio-economic 
contexts is weighing decarbonisation against the priority of expanding access to help reduce poverty. 
Compare, for instance, electricity grid coverage in various countries - 98.6% in China, 43% in India in 
2004 (Urmee et al 2009: 355), as compared to 45% in Ghana, 7.9% in Kenya or less than 0.1% in 
Niger at approximately the same time (Modi et al 2005: 43).  The drive for commercialisation as part 
of electricity reform meant that it was unviable to expand access to outside urban and industrial 
areas, leading to concern over how to achieve expansion of access in rural areas. As a result, since 
around 2000 access to electricity has become a more urgent priority for governments and donors 
alike when discussing energy sector needs relating to poverty reduction in low-income countries
7
. 
The figures, although unreliable, are stark. Out of 29 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 2009 
African Development Indicators identify only 10 with rural access rates above 10% (World Bank 
2009a). Recent estimates state that of the 21 Sub-Saharan African countries, over half (12) have 
levels of access to electricity of less than 20%, one third (7) between 20-50%, and only Nigeria and 
South Africa have access levels above 50% (Eberhard 2008: 35). In many cases, suppressed demand 
due to power shortages and inability to finance new connections is allowing population growth to 
outpace the electrification rate, leading to declining levels of access (Eberhard 2008: v). 
 
Earlier figures demonstrating the differences in electrification rates across various Sub-Saharan 
African states (and the urban-rural differences within them) are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Urban and rural dimensions of energy use in selected Sub-Saharan countries 
 
Country National 
Population 
in Millions 
(1999) 
National 
Electrification 
Rate (%) 
(2000, 2004) 
Urban 
Electrification 
Rate (%) 
(2004, 2002) 
Rural 
Electrification 
Rate (%) 
(2004, 2002) 
Ethiopia 61.7 4.7 13.0 0.7 
Ghana 19.7 45.0 82.5 20.9 
Tanzania 32.8 10.5 39.0 1.0 
Kenya 29.5 7.9 20.0 1.7 
Niger 10.4 < 1.0  36.6 0.2 
Senegal 9.3 30.1 68.9 6.1 
Chad 7.5 - 9.4 0.1 
 
Source: Adapted from Modi, V., McDade, S. Lallement, D. and Saghir, J. (2005) Energy Services for the 
Millennium Development Goals, Washington, DC and NY: the World Bank and UNDP, p. 43 
                                                          
7
 For example, the Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002), ‘The Johannesburg Plan of 
Action 2002’, UNESA; and World Bank (2001) The World Bank Group's Energy Program: Poverty Reduction, 
Sustainability and Selectivity, Washington DC: World Bank. 
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African governments and development partners, their traditional financiers in the power sector, both 
see access as a top priority.  Measures to create rural electrification or energy agencies (REAs) to 
facilitate this are ongoing and ambitious grid expansion projects are being written into Power Sector 
Master Plans (PSMPs).  
 
The PSMPs tend to emphasise utilisation of large-scale generation projects to exploit hydro and 
thermal potential and regional integration of grid networks. The need for system rehabilitation, let 
alone access expansion, coupled with limited Government financial and human capacity means that 
low-carbon growth is often of low national priority. It is therefore unlikely that mechanisms to help 
emerging economies develop indigenous capabilities for low-carbon growth will be seen as relevant. 
This is in sharp contrast to international discourse, which frequently accepts that access expansion 
and economic growth in low-income countries can be achieved through low-carbon pathways. It is 
necessary to link up the separate debates over access and low-carbon technology transfer to 
address local contexts and priorities and openly acknowledge the challenges they present. 
   
As noted earlier, those most likely to suffer from the consequences of dangerous climate change will 
be located in the least developed countries where access to electricity is currently lowest.  This raises 
a fundamental ethical debate over whether the same low-carbon growth pursued by developed and 
emerging economies should be pursued by, or imposed upon the lowest-income countries. A 
number of problematic issues currently exist in relation to current approaches being pursued in low-
income countries. First, most planned expansion in Africa is hydro-electric, and thus low-carbon 
(World Bank 2009b; World Energy Council 2007), although the sustainability of some large examples 
may be questionable.  With myriad power crises due to water shortages in times of drought, security 
of supply (using diverse indigenous resources – be they fossil fuels or renewable supplies) and 
regional integration is arguably more important to the national economy and access expansion than 
low-carbon growth. Second, governments of low-consuming countries might argue that even if 
expansion plans were achieved with carbon intensive generation plants the carbon emissions would 
still be minimal. Taking Tanzania’s PSMP as an example, the maximum estimate for national energy 
requirements by 2031 is 28,000GWh. In comparison, in 2004, South Africa produced 206,960GWh, 
India produced 587,870GWh and China produced 1,926,970GWh (Energy Information Administration 
2004). With financial constraints already a problem, unless some international financial incentives 
are put in place, how can these nations be expected to forego large expansion using carbon 
intensive, but larger scale, power plants in favour of smaller scale expansion using low-carbon 
technologies?  
DIVERSE CONTEXTS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL INNOVATION 
CAPABILITIES 
It is difficult to see how generalised international policy initiatives can be flexible enough to cater for 
national and sub-national perspectives and priorities.  However, whilst access and decarbonisation 
might in some cases be viewed as conflicting objectives, there is much potential for designing 
energy systems that can serve both these and other purposes. 
 
There are a number of features of low-carbon generation technologies that might be relevant to 
improving access, especially if development is seen as an underlying policy goal – and not only 
economic growth centred around industrial centres close to the grid.  Many low-carbon technologies 
are decentralised. For example, distributed micro-generation technologies could in principle be 
combined where possible with intelligent grids and energy efficient end use technologies to provide 
more robust and resilient supplies. Such distributed energy systems that operate independently of 
the main power grid could be particularly appropriate in countries such as Tanzania, with a 
13 
 
geographical area of almost one million square kilometres and where over 80% of the population live 
in rural areas, only 2% of which have access to electricity.  
 
There is another, somewhat more subtle characteristic of such distributed generation approaches, 
especially with regard to the need specified earlier to innovate at the level of low carbon systems 
rather than merely in individual technologies. In many sub-Saharan African countries the building of 
grid transmission lines and sub-stations, let alone hydro and thermal power stations, often is 
outsourced to foreign firms.  Partly because policies pay insufficient attention to building local 
capabilities, indigenous innovation is rare in these contexts of power supply. However, indigenous 
innovation throughout the whole supply chain could be easier to achieve – and indeed is already 
occurring – in smaller, decentralised energy systems such as solar PV, mini-hydro and wind.  In 
distributed locales, technologies and behaviours are emerging that complement such low-carbon 
(and in many cases low-energy) systems (ESMAP 1999; Kammen 2002; World Bank 2008).  Alongside 
distributed generation, therefore, there is an opportunity for distributed innovation – the promotion 
of local innovation capabilities to incrementally tinker with and adapt external technologies in order 
to address local needs and environments.  The result, if implemented properly, will be the 
emergence of a more diverse assortment of socio-technical systems, catering for diverse and in 
many cases irreconcilable notions of development and sustainability.  However, it is important not to 
assume that such low carbon energy systems are automatically amenable to distributed innovation. 
Technological innovations such as smart grids can be complex (at least as envisaged in developed 
country contexts), and could demand high levels of innovative capacity to install, operate and 
maintain.  
 
Rather than the best low-carbon technologies diffusing from a unitary technological frontier, locally-
adapted innovations could therefore increasingly play an important role in low carbon development. 
In some (but not all) cases they will find application in other locations or markets.  Rather than 
established multinational companies seeking bottom-of-the-pyramid fortunes, these innovations 
may instead emerge from innovation actors in emerging economies that already serve informal, 
unregulated markets seeking radically low costs.  Such ‘below the radar’ innovation as it has been 
characterised by one group of scholars (Clark et al 2009) needs to be better understood so that it can 
more easily be identified and, where appropriate, supported by government or other actors.  At a 
more micro-level, mechanisms for sharing knowledge between individual innovators in different 
locales in appropriate and accessible ways (in a similar way to that envisaged by AfricaAdapt’s 
recently launched knowledge-sharing innovation fund) will also provide the opportunity for cross-
fertilization and flourishing of otherwise isolated innovations.   
COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITIES AND GLOBAL 
ENERGY TRANSITIONS 
The need for low carbon growth has been much discussed in policy circles in recent years. For both 
developed and developing countries, this particular direction for growth offers the possibility of 
allowing continued economic development whilst taking into account the global need for climate 
change mitigation. This paper has discussed the prospects for low carbon growth in developing 
countries with a particular focus on the role of low carbon innovation. 
 
As discussed at the outset, the characterisation of the transition to low carbon societies as one of 
‘low carbon growth’ is not without its problems. Over the past several decades, there have been 
repeated calls for a more critical approach to the policy focus on growth (or at least conventional 
economic growth) because of potential incompatibility with sustainable development. Seen in this 
light, it is perhaps better to talk in terms of low carbon development, and to debate what such 
development should look like. As with the general debate about development, there are many 
complex perspectives and factors that are important. 
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From the perspective of low carbon development, an important issue is the extent to which this 
process should be tied to economic growth, expressed by a steadily increasing level of GDP per 
capita. This paper has referred to the evidence of a strong association between energy consumption 
and GDP. If this strong association continues, low carbon development means either a radical shift to 
a lower carbon energy system or a shift towards a mode of development that is less reliant on 
economic growth - or perhaps a combination of both these strategies. But given the controversial 
nature of any move away from economic growth, the ‘decarbonisation’ of energy systems is 
particularly vital. 
 
In a developing country context, this distinction between low carbon growth and low carbon 
development seems rather semantic. In developed countries, there is evidence that increasing 
economic activity does not necessarily lead to greater levels of well being (e.g. Jackson 2009). 
However, within developing countries there is a pressing need to alleviate widespread poverty and 
raise incomes – often from very low levels. Here, increasing levels of GDP – both in general and per 
capita across all segments of the population – is still an essential part of the development process. 
 
However this debate may eventually be resolved, this paper has illustrated three principles for the 
inclusion of developing countries within global efforts to tackle climate change and improve access 
within developing countries to modern energy services. First, such efforts need to recognise that 
many developing countries are already low carbon societies, but these societies are failing to deliver 
the energy services people need. Hence advancing low carbon development as a policy goal can 
easily be misunderstood as being ‘anti development’. Second, there is a need for a differentiated 
approach to developing countries within any global agreement. Policies need to be context specific 
in terms of the country, region (rural/urban, richer/poorer), and the appropriateness of different low 
carbon technologies for each context. In other words, policies need to put into practice the principle 
within the Kyoto Protocol of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’.
8
 Third, there is a key role 
for innovation in low carbon development pathways. More specifically, innovation capabilities need 
to be fostered by a combination of localised innovation and international technology transfer. 
 
This paper has focused in particular on the third of these principles –the role of international 
collaborations in developing innovative capabilities. Experience shows that successful technology 
transfer should not only focus on the sale of low carbon technology hardware from one firm to 
another. Technology transfer should also contribute to innovative capabilities by strengthening the 
underlying knowledge associated with these technologies within developing countries. Such 
international collaborations should focus on the appropriate point along the research, development, 
demonstration and deployment spectrum, as defined by existing levels of innovative capabilities 
within a country or location. A ‘one size fits all’ approach will not work: policies to support such 
collaborations need to take into account each country or locality’s specific technological needs and 
capabilities. 
 
This need for a more differentiated approach to innovation should go beyond the Technology Needs 
Assessments that are currently being implemented under the UNFCCC. It means that the 
international policy process should support more comprehensive but locally-relevant low carbon 
development pathways. These pathways must include a combination of national developing country 
actions and support from OECD countries and in some cases the emerging economies. Such OECD 
support needs to be substantial. Many developing countries feel that for too long, the industrialised 
world has made and broken promises to assist them with more sustainable technologies and the 
costly impacts of global environmental problems. The international policy process must make good 
on these promises in a way that improves the capacity of developing countries to develop in a low 
carbon way. Supporting innovative capabilities is an indispensable part of this process. 
                                                          
8
 See Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol: 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/1678.php, accessed 10 September 2009 
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